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FROM GOOD HUSBANDRY TO REASONABLE USE: ILLINOIS
SURFACE WATER DRAINAGE LAW EVOLVES IN SUBDIVISION
CASE.
The drainage of unwanted surface water is a persistent problem in Illinois
as housing construction and rural alterations of land continue to be necessary
to meet current social needs. In the course of land development, changes in
natural drainage patterns of surface waters may cause flooding onto neighbor-
ing lands. The resulting disputes are governed by the law of surface waters, an
amalgam of property rules and tort principles. During the last century, Illinois
surface water drainage cases have adhered to inflexible rules which were
designed to facilitate agricultural development. In urban areas, however,
population density and the number of valuable structures concentrated on
small parcels of land increase the potential for high monetary damages in
surface water flooding cases. To the extent that rules developed to meet
simpler situations are insufficient to weigh the complexities of urban develop-
ment, a need for an alteration of surface water rules is apparent. Recently,
Illinois surface water law departed from the form it had followed since the
mid-19th century.
In Templeton v. Huss,' the Illinois Supreme Court sidestepped an
opportunity to adhere to the established natural flow rule and held that a
reasonable use rule was to be applied instead. As will be seen, the court's use
of ambiguous language left the dimensions of the change in the law unclear.
An evaluation of Huss will be implemented by a brief introduction to the
factual setting of a typical surface water suit and by a survey of the dominant
principles of drainage law in Illinois and other states. After a summary of the
Huss opinion, five plausible interpretations of the decision will be examined in
order to determine the probable impact of Huss on future litigation. The five
part analysis will consider the fact paterns likely to be governed by Huss and
the test intended by the court for future use in implementing its announced
policy of reasonableness.
INTRODUCTION TO SURFACE WATER DRAINAGE LAW
Surface waters accumulate on land from rain, springs, and melting snows
and then "diffuse themselves over the surface of the ground and seek a lower
level by force of gravity." 2 Surface waters do not regularly flow in defined
channels.as do rivers or streams.' The inability of surface waters to maintain
1. 57 111. 2d 134, 311 N.E.2d 141 (1974), rev'g 9 111. App. 3d 828, 292 N.E.2d 530
(1973).
2. Midgett v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 260 N.C. 241, 244, 132 S.E.2d
599, 604 (1963). See Dayton v. Drainage Comm'rs, 128 I11. 271, 21 N.E. 198 (1889); Groffv.
Ankenbrandt, 124 III. 51, 15 N.E. 40 (1888); Peck v. Herrington, 109 I11. 611, 616-17 (1884).
Flood waters which overflow stream banks are also classified as surface waters. Chicago, P.
& St. L. Ry. v. Reuter, 223 I11. 387, 79 N.E. 166 (1906).
3. Village of Crossville v. Stuart, 77 Ill. App. 513 (1898).
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an identity or to exist as a body of water marks the difference between surface
waters and lakes or ponds. Litigation arises when the acts of one owner
interfere with the natural drainage pattern to the injury of the other. As a
general rule, the parties to surface water disputes are an owner or user of
higher land, the defendant, and a neighboring lower landowner, the plaintiff.
In Illinois, a central issue in drainage suits has been whether the defendant has
diverted waters from the natural course of drainage. When Illinois courts
speak of a natural course of drainage, they mean the natural direction of
drainage across the lands in question.' The course of drainage concept also
refers to the precise location on the boundary between adjoining tracts where
surface waters would naturally drain onto the lower land-the natural drainage
outlet.s Therefore, diversion of the natural drainage course occurs when one
owner taps into waters naturally draining in another direction or discharges
surface water onto lower land at a point different than the natural drainage
outlet.
American surface water drainage law falls into four distinct categories:
the common enemy rule, the civil law or natural flow rule, a reasonable use
modification of the civil law rule, and a reasonable use rule. Under the early
common enemy rule, landowners could treat surface waters as a common
enemy.' Each had a right incident to his ownership to fend off surface waters
without incurring liability for injury to adjoining property. Owners of adjacent
land could take defensive measures and repel the waters flowing onto their
lands.7 The common enemy rule has been modified so that a landowner may
rightfully obstruct surface water "only so long as such obstruction ... is
incident to ordinary use, improvement, or protection of his land, and is done
without malice or negligence."' In 1869, the common enemy rule was
expressly rejected in Illinois in favor of the civil law rule.'
4. See Fenton & Thompson R.R. v. Adams, 221 III. 201, 211, 77 N.E. 531, 534 (1906);
Dayton v. Drainage Comm'rs, 128 III. 271, 276, 21 N.E. 198, 199 (1889); Peck v. Herrington,
109 Ill. 611 (1884); Mello v. Lepisto, 77 Il1. App. 2d 399, 403, 222 N.E.2d 543, 545 (1966)
(complaint which alleged that defendant had violated natural patterns of drainage held legally
insufficient because no allegation as to the direction of natural drainage had been made).
5. Montgomery v. Downey, 17 Il1. 2d 451, 162 N.E.2d 6 (1959); Fenton & Thompson
R.R. v. Adams, 221 Ill. 201, 77 N.E. 531 (1906); Daum v. Cooper, 208 Il1. 391, 70 N.E. 339
(1904); Bundy v. City of Sullivan, I Ill. App. 2d 212, 117 N.E.2d 302 (1954); Town of
Saratoga v. Jacobson, 193 Il. App. 110 (1914).
6. "[The common enemy] rule of surface waters is, in substance that a possessor of land
has an unlimited and unrestricted legal privilege to deal with surface water on his land as he
pleases, regardless of the harm which he may thereby cause to others." Kinyon & McClure,
Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. Rav. 891, 898 (1940).
7. E.g., Greeley v. Maine Central R.R., 53 Me. 200 (1865) (railroad embankment
obstructed drainage); Gibson v. Sharp, 277 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955) (ditch filled in by
lower owner).
8. Maloney & Plager, Diffused Surface Water: Scourge or Bounty?, 8 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 72, 79 (1968). See generally Dobbins, Surface Water Drainage, 36 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 518, 523-24 (1961); Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421, 437-38 (1958).
Jurisdictions following common enemy rules include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connect-
icut, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Virginia, Washington. West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 5 R. CLARK. WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 451.2, at 490 (R. Beck 1972) [hereinafter cited as CLARK].
9. Gillham v. Madison County R.R., 49 Il. 484, 485-86 (1869).
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The Illinois civil law or natural flow rule, in its purest form, provided that
one was strictly liable for interfering with the natural flow of surface waters to
the injury of another's "interests in the use and enjoyment of his land."' 0
Under this early rule, the lower tract was burdened by a natural drainage
servitude." The upper owner's easement was limited since he could not alter
the natural flow to increase the burden on the land below. 2 The early rule
inhibited land development. Since all interference with natural drainage was
prohibited, higher lands could not be improved and tilled. To facilitate
agricultural development, Illinois courts declared a good husbandry exception
to the natural flow rule. 3 Under this modification, the owner of the dominant
estate could make drains on his own land as required by good husbandry and
thereby increase the flow of surface waters onto lower lands. As seen in the
leading good husbandry case, 4 courts have opined that the upper owner
should not be required to leave his land marshy and untillable merely because
drainage would cause damage below. However, the upper owner's drainage
privilege was not unrestricted. A quantitative limit to permissible drainage was
recognized in cases holding that a large pond could not be drained to the
destruction of the usefulness of the lower land.'" At first glance, such
limitation is consistent with a policy determination that the burden on the
lower land outweighed the benefit of draining the upper tract. However, since
the exception was formed to assist development, the upper limit of acceptable
drainage was high. A survey of Illinois Supreme Court dec isions discloses
only one case 6 where no diversion was proved and the lower owner
recovered. In that case, the threatened drainage would have destroyed
plaintiff's land for farming and habitation. Therefore, as a practical matter,
under the good husbandry exception proof of diversion has been required in
Illinois for injuries caused by less than totally destructive increases in drainage
flow. The good husbandry exception did not alter the cardinal natural flow
rule that prohibited diversion.' 7 A user or occupier of land still could not
10. Templeton v. Huss, 57 Iil. 2d 134, 137, 311 N.E.2d 141, 143 (1974). The
characterization of the rule as a civil law rule stems from the rule's American origin in Louisiana.
See Orleans Navig. Co. v. Mayor of New Orleans, I La. 73 (1812).
11. Gillham v. Madison County R.R., 49 I1. 484, 487 (1869). The court drew the
easement analysis from E. WASHBURNE, TREATISE OF THE AMERICAN LAW OF EASEMENTS AND
SERVITUDES 355 (2d ed. 1867). Gillham, supra at 487. See also Ribordy v. Murray, 177 1l. 134,
52 N.E. 325 (1898); Totel v. Bonnefoy, 123 III. 653, 657-58, 14 N.E. 687, 689 (1888).
12. Templeton v. Huss, 57 Ill. 2d 134, 137, 311 N.E.2d 141, 143 (1974).
13. See cases collected, Templeton v. Huss, 9 111. App. 3d 828, 838, 292 N.E.2d 530, 537
(1973).
14. Peck v. Herrington, 109 Ill. 611, 620 (1884).
15. Hicks v. Silliman, 93 Il. 255 (1879); Wiese v. Mieher, 14 Ill. App. 2d 126, 143
N.E.2d 404 (1957) (abstract only published).
16. Hicks v. Silliman, 93 111. 255 (1879).
17. See Adams v. Abel, 290 I1. 496, 125 N.E. 320 (1919); Broadwell Special Drainage
Dist. No. 1 v. Lawrence, 231 I1. 86, 83 N.E. 104 (1907); Daum v. Cooper, 208 111. 391, 70
N.E. 339 (1904); Lambert v. Alcorn, 144 Ill. 313, 33 N.E. 53 (1893); Wilson v. Bondurant,
142 Il. 645, 32 N.E. 498 (1892); Dayton v. Drainage Comm'rs, 128 111. 271, 21 N.E. 198
(1889); Anderson v. Henderson, 124 Ill. 164, 16 N.E. 232 (1888); Peck v. Herrington, 109 111.
611 (1884).
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divert the natural course of drainage even though he was exercising good
husbandry.18 Proof of diversion has also been held to be essential to recovery
in non-agricultural drainage cases.' 9 Therefore, under the Illinois civil law rule
as modified, recovery for harm caused by an increased flow of surface waters
has required proof of diversion from the natural course of drainage."0
To prevent the possibly harsh results of a strict application of the natural
flow rule, some states" have adopted a reasonable use modification. A
The rule of Peck v. Herrington was codified by The Farm Drainage Act, Ill. Laws 1885. § 4
at 77. The good husbandry rule survives in the current Illinois Drainage Code, ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 42, § 2-1 (1973), which provides that:
Land may be drained in the general course of natural drainage by either open or covered
drains. When such a drain is entirely upon the land of the owner constructing the drain,
he shall not be liable in damages therefore.
18. Diversion has been held to be wrongful per se. See, e.g., Mellor v. Pilgrim, 7 IIl. App.
306, 310-11 (1880) (diversion a wrongful act for which plaintiff could recover nominal damages;
proof of actual damage unnecessary to prevent ripening of prescriptive right).
19. See People ex rel. Speck v. Peeler, 290 II1. 451, 125 N.E. 306 (1919) (right of upper
owner to increase flow without liability to lower owner, provided natural drainage course
followed, is the same whether the higher land is a farm or public highway); Smith v. City of
Woodstock, 17 I1. App. 3d 951, 309 N.E.2d 45 (1974) (city enjoined from constructing storm
drain which would have collected waters from another watershed. Construction of portion of
storm drain which conformed to natural course of drainage not enjoined even though flow
increased); City of Peru v. City of LaSalle, 119 III. App. 2d 211, 220, 255 N.E.2d 502, 506
(1970) (dictum) (surface waters may be gathered in municipal areas including subdivisions
improved by houses and streets and, as long as collected waters are drained into their natural
outlet, the lower owner may not complain); Mello v. Lepisto, 77 III. App. 2d 399, 403, 222
N.E.2d 543, 545 (1966) (diversion must be alleged to state cause of action and must be proved
to recover in urban drainage case. Court expressly declared civil law rule, not reasonable use rule,
to be Illinois law regardless of degree of development); Bundy v. City of Sullivan, 1 111. App. 2d
212, 117 N.E.2d 302 (1954) (city constructed ditch which drained surface waters from city
streets onto plaintiffs' lands. Plaintiffs claimed that surface waters could not be lawfully drained
through artificial channels. Complaint held fatally defective for failure to allege that ditch was not
in general course of natural drainage).
Surface water drainage suits involving agricultural lands have greatly outnumbered urban
drainage cases. The disparity may be explained by the fact that surface drainage problems are
prevented by municipal drainage systems, constructed under statutory authorization. See ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 9-3-1, 9-3-2, 11-109-1, 11-110-1 (1973). See generally Dobbins,
Relationships Between Drainage Districts And Other Municipal Entities Exercising Storm
Drainage Powers 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 294.
20. But see Comment. Illinois Drainage Law, 63 ILL. BAR J. 466 (1975). The Illinois
civil law rule also prohibits the lower owner's obstruction of the natural course of drainage to the
injury of higher lands. See Geis v. Rohrer, 12 Il. 2d 133, 145 N.E.2d 596 (1957); Gough v.
Goble, 2 11. 2d 577, 119 N.E.2d 252 (1954); Druce v. Blanchard, 338 I1. 211, 170 N.E. 260
(1930); Town of Nameoki v. Buenger, 275 11. 423, 114 N.E. 129 (1916).
In Pinkstaff v. Steffy, 216 Il. 406, 413, 75 N.E. 163, 165 (1905), the court held that the
lower owner was not entitled to obstruct the natural flow even though in so doing he was
exercising good husbandry. But cf. Mauvaisterre Drainage & Levee Dist. v. Wabash Ry., 299 Ill.
299, 132 N.E. 559 (1921); Wills v. Babb, 222 I1. 95, 78 N.E. 42 (1906) (lower owner may
obstruct surface waters flowing onto his land as a result of the upper owner's diversion from the
natural drainage course).
21. This modification is followed in California and Maryland. See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal.
2d 396, 409, 412 P.2d 529, 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 281 (1966); Sainato v. Potter, 222 Md.
263, 267-68, 159 A.2d 632, 634 (1960); see generally Note, Drainage of Surface Waters Under
the Civil Law Rule As Applied in Maryland, 11 MD. L. REv. 58 (1950). Language in the
decisions of Kentucky, Delaware, and Florida suggests reasonable use modifications. See Klutey
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balancing test is applied to gauge the reasonableness of the parties' conduct.
Factors weighed include: the gravity of the harm; the utility of the actor's
conduct; the foreseeability of the harm; and the motive of the actor.23 When
both parties have acted reasonably, liability falls upon the one who altered the
natural flow, in accordance with the civil law principle which prohibits all
interference with the natural course of drainage.
2 4
A fourth drainage doctrine, distinct from the common enemy and civil
law rules and their modifications, is the reasonable use rule. In some states, a
rule of reasonable use alone controls surface water drainage disputes.2 5
Courts following this rule adhere generally to the Restatement of Torts
elements of liability governing non-trespassory invasions of the interest in the
private use of land.26 Liability for intentional invasions depends on whether
the actor's conduct was unreasonable and liability for unintentional invasions
does not attach unless the actor was negligent or reckless.." The test applied
by courts in implementing this rule closely resembles the one used where the
civil law rule is modified by a reasonable use standard. At least one
commentator has suggested that no substantial difference exists between the
reasonable use modification and the reasonable use rule itself.2
NINETEENTH CENTURY RULE YIELDS TO TWENTIETH CENTURY PROBLEMS
In Templeton v. Huss,29 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a policy of
reasonable use is to be applied to to the issue of the liability of the owner of
higher land for injury to property caused by the increased flow of surface
water onto lower land when the upper owner has interfered with the natural
drainage pattern of surface waters through construction of a residential
subdivision. The plaintiff, Templeton, owned farmland adjacent to defendants'
v. Commonwealth Dep't of Highways, 428 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Ky. 1967); Burkshire Terrace,
Inc. v. Schroerlucke, 467 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971); E. J. Hollingsworth Co. v. Jardel
Co., 40 Del. Ch. 196, 201, 178 A.2d 307, 310 (Ct. Ch. 1962); Brumley v. Dorner, 78 Fla. 495,
503, 83 So. 912, 914 (1919).
22. See generally CLARK, supra note 8, § 452.2 (C), at 508-11; Note, Law of Water in
New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 621, 688-90 (1968); Alstyne, Inverse Condemnation:
Unintended Physical Damage, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 449-53 (1969).
23. See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 410, 412 P.2d 529, 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 281
(1966); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 822-33 (1939); CLARK, supra note 8, § 452.2(C), at 509;
Battisto v. Perkins, 210 Md. 542, 124 A.2d 288 (1956).
24. See Sheffet v. County of Los Angeles, 3 Cal. App. 3d 720, 730, 84 Cal. Rptr. 11, 17
(1970); Burrows v. State, 260 Cal. App. 2d 29, 32-33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 868, 871 (1968).
25. Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Utah
have adopted this rule. See CLARK, supra note 8, § 453.2, at 515-17; Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421,
434-37 (1958).
26. E.g., Armstrong v. Francis, 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956); Enderson v. Kelehan,
226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948).
27. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 833, comment a at 270 (1939).
28. CLARK, supra note 8, § 453.3, at 518. The civil law rule provides that an upper owner
may not interfere with the natural flow and the modification adds: unless the owner acts
reasonably. The reasonable use rule states that surface water may or may not be interfered with,
depending on whether the conduct is or is not reasonable. Id.
29. 57 Ill. 2d 134, 141,311 N.E.2d 141, 145-46 (1974).
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tract. Huss' subdivision construction interfered with the seepage of surface
water into the soil and an increased amount of water flooded the plaintiff's
land to the injury of crops. Templeton's suit was filed against Huss and the
Village of Oreana. The plaintiff claimed that the developer had altered the
natural course of surface drainage by diverting water from a different
watershed. At trial, Templeton was unable to prove diversion and judgment
was entered for defendants on that claim. The complaint also included an
allegation that the developers "by converting their parcel . . . into a
residential subdivision had increased both the amount and rate of surface
water runoff flowing onto the plaintiff's land." 30 Before trial, this claim was
dismissed as legally insufficient because it included no allegation of diversion
from another watershed. Templeton appealed the judgment and the dismissal
of the count alleging injurious increase of flow.
The appellate court affirmed," holding that the lower court's conclusion
that no diversion had been proved was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. In addition, the dismissal of the allegation of increased flow was
upheld on the ground that an actionable violation of the Illinois natural flow
rule required an allegation that defendants had diverted the natural course of
drainage.
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the increased flow allegation and the
Illinois Supreme Court framed the issue as whether an upper owner's liability
for damage inflicted on lower lands by an increased flow of surface water is
"limited to that caused by diversion from another watershed.""2 The upper
owner's liability was held to be not so limited. The court reviewed the cases
preceding the adoption of the Illinois natural flow rule. The first Illinois
surface water case to announce the natural flow rule" was said to have
recognized a fundamental riparian rights principle which the Huss court
quoted. "[A] nd although the act of the one person may be in itself lawful, yet,
if in its consequences it necessarily damages the property of another, the
party occasioning the damage is liable to make reparation.13 4 In continuing its
survey of the early natural flow rule, the Huss court referred to language in an
Illinois Supreme Court case" which indicated "an inclination to rely upon the
law of watercourses3" which has long been essentially one of reasonable use,
for analogies in cases of appropriation of surface waters . . . and a willingness
30. Id. at 136, 311 N.E.2d at 143.
31. Templiton v. Huss, 9 111. App. 3d 828, 842, 292 N.E.2d 530, 539 (1973).
32. Templeton v. Huss, 57 111. 2d 134, 137, 311 N.E.2d 141, 143 (1974).
33. Gillham v. Madison County R.R., 49 I1. 484 (1869) (lower owner liable for
obstruction of natural flow of surface waters).
34. Templeton v. Huss, 57 Il1. 2d 134, 138, 311 N.E.2d 141, 144 (1974), quoting Stout v.
McAdams, 3 I1. 68, 69, 2 Scam. 67, 69 (1839) (early riparian rights case).
The quoted language illustrates the concept of the correlative rights and duties of riparian
landowners. The principle of correlative rights governs riparian water law. See infra notes 54-58
and accompanying text.
35. Gormley v. Sanford, 52 Il1. 158, 162-63 (1869).
36. That is, the law of flowing rivers and streams. Id. at 162.
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to alter the [civil law] rule, or abandon it altogether in the case of city lots
provided with a reasonable alternative means of drainage.", 7 Given this
background, the good husbandry exception was cited as the first modification
of the civil law rule. As noted earlier,3 this exception permits the upper owner
to "make such drains, for agricultural purposes, on his own land, as may be
required by good husbandry, although by so doing the flow may be
increased."3 9
In weighing the merits of the appeal, the court considered the issue of
liability for harmful interference with natural seepage to be a matter of first
impression in Illinois.40 Referring to the natural flow rule and its good
husbandry modification, the supreme court stated that the principle which
prevents unreasonable agricultural development applies to substantial altera-
tion of natural drainage by "surface and subsurface changes which interfere
with the natural seepage of water into the soil of the dominant estate."', In
reversing the appellate court, the supreme court held:
The question . . . is whether the increased flow of surface waters
from the land of defendants . . regardless of whether it was caused
by diversion from another watershed . . . the grading and paving of
streets, or the construction of houses . . .was beyond a range
consistent with the policy of reasonableness of use which led initially
to the good-husbandry exception.
42
The court did not prescribe the test to be used in applying its reasonable use
policy. Thus, the value of the decision as Illinois precedent depends on further
analysis.
Huss AS PRECEDENT: FIVE INTERPRETATIONS
The Huss decision will have a substantial effect on Illinois surface water
law since, contrary to prior cases, diversion from the natural course of
37. Templeton v. Huss, 57 I1. 2d 134, 138, 311 N.E.2d 141, 144 (1974). The quoted
passage is the Huss court's characterization of Gormley v. Sanford, 52 I1. 158, 162-63 (1869).
The reference to "cases of appropriation of surface waters," Huss, supra at 138, 311 N.E.2d at
144 (emphasis added), is misleading since Illinois surface water disputes involve the disposal of
unwanted waters. Gormley, supra, was not an appropriation case but was a suit to remedy
damage to the upper owner's orchard caused by the lower owner's obstruction of a drainage ditch.
The characterization of Gormley, supra, in Huss, supra at 138, 311 N.E.2d at 144, was
broad and not fully supported by Gormley, supra at 162-66. See infra notes 49-51 and
accompanying text.
38. See supra note 13.
39. Peck v. Herrington, 109 Ill. 611,619 (1884).
40. Prior to Huss, Illinois surface water cases were involved with lateral drainage flow, that
is, waters draining across the surface. Seepage is an element of natural drainage. As waters
diffuse across land, they soak into the ground. Logically, digging ditches to increase the drainage
flow of surface waters would result in an interference with natural seepage because waters which
would have soaked into the soil instead flow through the ditch onto the lower land. An early
appellate court opinion recognized this effect. Town of Saratoga v. Jacobson, 193 Ill. App. 110,
116 (1914). However, before Huss, Illinois courts have not singled out wrongful interference
with natural seepage as a sole basis of liability for damaging increases in the quantity of water
drained.
41. Templeton v. Huss, 57 Ill. 2d 134, 141,311 N.E.2d 141, 145 (1974).
42. Id. at 141, 311 N.E.2d at 146.
CHICA GO-KENTLA W REVIEW
drainage was not considered essential to the legal sufficiency of plaintiff's
complaint. 43 However, Huss' precise impact is yet uncertain because the
meaning of the announced reasonable use rule is unclear. In evaluating the
practical meaning of Huss, two areas of primary concern to the practitioner
will be the factual situations covered by the new rule, and the actual working
test intended by the court to implement its reasonable use rule. Accordingly,
this inquiry will first consider whether the decision should be confined to its
facts or whether the court intended a rule of broader application.
Since the court used the term reasonableness of use without defining an
implementing test, implications drawn from the language of the opinion and
the drainage law of other jurisdictions must be analyzed in assessing the
court's probable intentions. Four plausible interpretations of the new test will
be discussed. 1) The court may have intended to apply a reasonable use test
to residential construction analogous to the good husbandry exception. 2)
Because the court cited a decision suggesting an analogy between surface
water cases involving city lots and the riparian rule of reasonable use, the new
test may correspond to the riparian test. 3) Common meaning and usage of
the term reasonable use in the water law of other jurisdictions cannot be
overlooked as a possible key to the court's intentions in Huss. Therefore, the
court may have meant to adopt an urban reasonable use modification of the
Illinois natural flow rule as seen in the drainage law of some states. 4) Finally,
similar to the law of other states, a full reasonable use test applicable to all
Illinois surface water drainage cases may have been indicated.
Factual Settings Governed by Huss Rule
Before analyzing the dimensions of the Huss test, the scope of the rule's
factual application must be examined. The court in Huss focused on
unreasonable interferences with natural seepage as actionable under what it
referred to as the reasonable agricultural development policy previously
applied to lateral drainage. The injury Templeton sought to remedy was water
damage caused by the construction of a housing development with paved
streets and driveways. Residential construction of this type renders the
surface of land impervious to seepage of surface water. 44 The court's
extension of the agricultural development rule to natural seepage must be
considered in connection with the case's facts. Limited to its facts, Huss may
be read as applying a reasonable use test to non-agricultural development
43. Contra, Hicks v. Silliman, 93 Ill. 255 (1879) (upper owner attempted to drain large
pond and was enjoined because quantity of flow would have been "undue and unnatural." Id. at
264); Wiese v. Mieher, 14 Ill. App. 2d 126, 143 N.E.2d 404 (1957) (cited rule nearly identical
to Hicks, supra, but case has minimal value as authority because only published in abstract
form).
44. E.g., extensive paving and grading of streets and driveways prevents water from
soaking into the soil. See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273
(1966) (construction of building and parking lot); Battisto v. Perkins, 210 Md. 542, 124 A.2d
288 (1956) (grading in housing development); Armstrong v. Francis, 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4
(1956) (construction of subdivision).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
which prevents natural seepage and causes a materially increased flow of
surface water to the injury of adjacent lower lands. Under this reading of
Huss, the modified natural flow rule would apply in agricultural situations,
while a reasonable use test would be used to decide cases involving
interferences with natural seepage caused by grading, paving, and the like.
However, the Huss opinion suggests a more general rule which does not limit
the reasonable use policy to natural seepage cases.
In concluding Huss, the supreme court stated, regardless whether the
increased flow was caused by septic tank installation, paving, home construc-
tion, or diversion from another watershed, the issue of liability depended on
whether the conduct was reasonable. 45 The court's listing of grading, paving,
and home construction is consistent with a rule limited to natural seepage
cases. However, the inclusion of diversion from another watershed may be a
signpost left to indicate the court's inclination toward a broader adoption of
the reasonable use rule when properly put at issue in future cases. Because it
was not proved at trial, diversion was factually irrelevant to the appeal. Yet,
the court included diversion as an example of the causes of increased flow
which are subject to the reasonable use policy. Since diversion from another
watershed is an interference with the lateral drainage flow, the case suggests
that the declared policy of reasonable use is not limited to obstruction of
natural seepage-vertical drainage. Therefore, Huss may be interpreted as
having declared a reasonable use rule applicable to urban development which
interferes with natural seepage or which diverts the natural course of drainage.
Contrary to the long standing natural flow rule, diversion would no longer be
actionable per se.4 6 The developer's conduct would be gauged by a standard
of reasonableness which the court left undefined. The practical meaning of the
Huss reasonable use test may be gleaned from four possible interpretations of
the case.
Good Husbandry Analogy
Language in Huss suggests an analogy between the announced reasona-
ble use test and the good husbandry exception. The court characterized good
husbandry cases as having followed a rule of reasonable agricultural develop-
ment.47 The test adopted by Huss was expressed in the question whether the
increased flow was "beyond a range consistent with the policy of reasonable-
ness of use which led initially to the good husbandry exception." 4
The good husbandry exception, however, does not provide a workable
reasonable use test. As originally framed, the exception favored development
and permitted the increased flow of waters short of the destruction of the
45. 57 111. 2d 134, 141, 311 N.E.2d 141,146 (1974).
46. See supra notes 17, 18 and accompanying text.
47. Templeton v. Huss, 57 Il1. 2d 134, 141, 311 N.E.2d 141, 145 (1974) (by
implication).
48. Id. at 141, 311 N.E.2d at 146.
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
lower land's usefulness. The range of permissible injury was broad, and
research has uncovered no cases holding that a less than destructive flow was
actionable because the upper owner had exercised "bad husbandry." In
practical effect, the good husbandry exception provides no well defined test
balancing the benefit to the actor with the burden on the individual harmed.
Further, diversion from the natural course of drainage is uniformly proscribed
by good husbandry cases, while Huss provided that the reasonable use rule
was to apply regardless that the increased flow was caused by diversion.
Therefore, an analogy between the Huss rule and the good husbandry
exception yields no satisfactory test for the implementation of Huss in future
cases.
Riparian Reasonable Use Test
In tracing the history of the Illinois natural flow rule, the Huss court said
that in Gormley v. Sanford49 the Illinois Supreme Court showed an inclination
to rely on riparian law "which has long been essentially one of reasonable
use" 50 as analogous to surface water cases. The language in Huss left the
impression that the analogy found in Gormley was based on the riparian
reasonable use rule. Notably, this impression is unsupported by Gormley,
where the court applied the riparian natural flow principle that an upper owner
has a right to the unobstructed flow of streamwater to a case involving a lower
owner's obstruction of surface water.11 The Gormley court did not indicate
that the rights of riparian owners to make a reasonable use of flowing waters
applied to surface water drainage disputes. Seemingly, in Huss, Gormley was
expanded beyond its boundaries to highlight a relationship between surface
water cases and the riparian reasonable use rule. The supreme court's efforts
to underscore the analogy are also seen in the fact that the analogy excerpted
from Gormley was drawn from language unnecessary to the opinion,"
language which was never incorporated into Illinois decisions. In pointing to
an analogy between surface water cases and the riparian reasonable use rule,
the Huss court may have indicated that riparian law principles are to be read
into its holding.
The rights of Illinois riparian owners are governed by the law of natural
watercourses, including rivers, flowing streams, and lakes. 3 As a basic
principle, riparian owners have a shared, correlative right to make reasonable
and beneficial uses of the water flowing across their lands.' 4 The riparian rule
49. 52 111. 158 (1869).
50. Templeton v. Huss, 57 111. 2d 134, 138, 311 N.E.2d 141, 144 (1974).
51. 52 Ill. 158, 162-63 (1869).
52. See supra note 36.
53. See generally Cribbet, Water As A Species of Private Property, 47 ILL. BAR J. 449,
461 (1959).
54. See generally Ratcliff, Private Rights Under Illinois Drainage Law, 1960 U. ILL. L.F.
198, 199. The recognition of correlative rights is grounded on two facts. First, habitually flowing
waters are useful for domestic, agricultural, and industrial purposes. Such domestic and
productive needs may be common to all riparian owners. Second, since natural watercourses flow
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of reasonable use developed as a means of balancing the right of one owner to
make a particular use of flowing waters with the rights of other owners
adversely affected by that use." In applying the riparian reasonable use rule,
Illinois courts have weighed the purpose and extent of the use at issue with
the actual injury caused,56 have balanced the respective requirements of the
parties, leaving to the jury the question whether the defendant had used more
than his reasonable share, 7 and have weighed the social utility of the actor's
conduct with the impact of the action on private rights."
The Huss court's reference to an analogy between riparian principles and
surface water cases suggests a new emphasis on the correlative rights of
landowners. While prior Illinois surface water cases focused on the relative
locations of land in determining the fixed privileges of upper and lower
owners, the riparian cases look to the conduct of the actor under the
circumstances. Under rules analogous to riparian law, a landowner could rid
his land of surface waters without liability, provided that he did not
unreasonably interfere with the rights of others to use and enjoy their lands. A
burden/benefit balancing test including considerations of social utility and the
extent of the actual harm would also seem to be indicated.
However, the riparian rule does not supply a full explanation of the test
intended by the supreme court in Huss. The rule was not expressly
incorporated into the holding. Further, riparian and surface water cases are
dissimilar, since the flow of streamwater is a valuable incident of riparian
ownership while surface waters are subject to no productive uses because of
their diffuse and transitory nature.5 9 The drainage law of other states may
suggest a more complete definition of the Huss test.
Urban Reasonable Use Modification
In the American law of surface waters, the words "reasonable use" are
terms of art with defined meanings. In Huss, the court's use of those words
across many separately owned lands, a substantial appropriation, pollution, or diversion by one
owner could materially impair the usefulness of the water for other proprietors.
55. Id. at 199-200.
56. "When questions arise between riparian owners respecting the right of one to make a
particular use of the water in which they have a common right, the right will generally depend on
the reasonableness of the use and the extent of the detriment to the lower owner." Tetherington
v. Donk Bros. Coal Co., 232 Il. 522, 525, 83 N.E. 1048, 1049 (1908),followed in Sandusky
Portland Cement Co. v. Dixon Pure Ice Co., 221 F. 200, 204 (7th Cir. 1915).
57. E.g., Bliss v. Kennedy, 43 Il. 67 (1867) (two factories on same stream).
58. "The law here ... acts with a reasonable reference to public convenience and general
good, and is not betrayed into a narrow strictness, subversive of common use, nor into an
extravagant looseness, which would destroy private rights." Evans v. Merriweather, 4 111. (3
Scam.) 492, 495 (1842).
59. However, a broad analogy between riparian and surface cases may be constructed. In
riparian cases, the right in question is a right to the use of flowing water. The right is infringed by
conduct affecting the flow, e.g., by pollution, obstruction, or consumption. The resulting injury is
an interference with the right to use the stream. In surface water cases, the right in question is the
landowner's right to use and enjoy his land. His right is abridged by conduct which affects his
land, that is, by flooding. The resulting injury is an interference with his right of use and
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with knowledge of their independent significance60 indicates a possible key to
the announced reasonable use test. In other jurisdictions, "reasonable use"
either modifies another rule such as the civil law rule, or is itself the basic
operating rule.6" The law of California provides an excellent example of the
reasonable use modification of the civil law rule. In New Jersey, a reasonable
use rule has replaced the common enemy doctrine 62 and is the primary test.
California adopted a reasonable use modification of the civil law rule in
Keys v. Romley. 63 In Keys, defendant, an upper owner, had constructed a
skating rink building with gutters which discharged collected rainwater across
a large, paved parking lot onto plaintiff's lower land. The court noted that the
long-rooted civil law rule was based on property concepts which were not
sufficiently flexible to meet the complexities of modern land development
problems. Although past cases had spoken in terms of the property concepts
of servitudes and easements, the court felt that the flexibility of a tort
approach was more desirable because such approach would permit a consider-
ation of the particular facts and circumstances of individual cases according to
a standard of reasonableness of conduct. The Keys rule was applied through a
balancing test in which several factors were to be weighed: the gravity of the
harm; the utility of the defendant's conduct; the foreseeability of the harm;
and the motive of the actor.6
In states following this modificatiori, established civil law rules have been
qualified to prevent the possibly harsh results of applying rigid property rules
and to articulate a flexible rule of reason which recognizes the correlative
rights of adjoining landowners to use and enjoy their property. 65 The
underlying policy judgment has been that when unreasonable conduct results
in material injury to property, the value of the civil law rule's predictability
must yield to the possessor's interest in the use and enjoyment of his land.66
Huss can be read as having applied a similar limitation to the civil law
rule. As will be recalled, prior Illinois case law showed that an upper owner
enjoyment. While riparian owners have a common right to be free of unreasonable uses of waters,
landowners would have an analogous right to be free from the unreasonable disposal of surface
waters.
60. See Brief for Appellant at 4-6, Templeton v. Huss, 57 111. 2d 134, 311 N.E.2d 141
(1974) (cases following reasonable use modification of the civil law rule and the full reasonable
use rule were cited to the supreme court); Brief for Illinois Agricultural Ass'n as Amicus Curiae
at 14-20, Templeton v. Huss, 57 11. 2d 134, 311 N.E.2d 141 (1974).
61. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
62. Armstrong v. Francis, 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
63. 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966).
64. Id. at 409, 412 P.2d at 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 281, citing Sheehan v. Flynn, 59 Minn.
436, 61 N.W. 462 (1894); Armstrong v. Francis, 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
65. See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966);
Sainato v. Potter, 222 Md. 263, 159 A.2d 632 (1960); Note, Drainage of Surface Waters Under
the Civil Law Rule As Applied in Maryland, 11 MD. L. REV. 58, 63 (1950); Maloney & Plager,
Diffused Surface Water: Scourge or Bounty?, 8 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 72, 77 (1968).
66. Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 409, 412 P.2d 529, 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 281
(1966).
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could increase the flow by altering drainage on his property, provided that the
additional water was returned to the natural drainway before it was discharged
onto the lower land and that it had not been diverted from another
watershed.6 7 The Huss court, however, refused a strict application of the
Illinois civil law rule as it had evolved. By implication, the court refused to
apply the existing Illinois rule since to do so would permit residential
developers to materially injure lower lands through the increased flow of
surface waters which had not been diverted. According to Huss, the dominant
owner's natural flow easement was not unrestricted, as defendant subdivider
argued, but was limited and modified by a rule of reasonable use. Apparently,
the predictability of the Illinois civil law rule was made to yield to the concept
that adjoining landowners have correlative rights and duties that limit and
define acceptable conduct. Therefore, Huss clearly suggests the application of
an urban reasonable use modification to the Illinois natural flow rule and the
adoption of a tort oriented balancing test to implement the new rule.
Full Reasonable Use Rule
Another possible approach to Huss is that the case signaled the adoption
of a full reasonable use rule and the abandonment of the civil law rule. The
reasonable use rules of other states are applied through balancing tests similar
to the one outlined in the discussion of Keys." Basset v. Salisbury,'69 cited as
a leading reasonable use case,70 set out the rule's principles: "The rights of
each landowner being similar, and his enjoyment dependent upon the action of
the other landowners, these rights must be valueless unless exercised with
reference to each other, and are correlative."'" In Armstrong v. Francis,7 2
where New Jersey changed from a common enemy rule to a reasonable use
rule, the court applied correlative rights principles to the issue of a
subdivider's liability for damage from a greatly increased flow of surface
water. The court's policy considerations reflected a dissatisfaction with
inflexible property rules in the context of urban development:
It is . . . true that society has a great interest that land shall be
developed for the greater good. . . .But while today's mass home
building projects . . are . . . in the social good, no reason suggests
itself why, in justice, the economic costs incident to the expulsion of
surface waters in the transformation of the rural or semi-rural areas
• . . into urban or suburban communities should be borne in every
case by adjoining landowners rather than by those who engage in
such projects for profit. Social progress and the common well-being
are . . .better served by a just . . .balancing of the competing
67. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
68. See also supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
69. 43 N.H. 569 (1862).
70. Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421, 435 (1958).
71. 43 N.H. at 577.
72. 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
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interests according to the general principles of fairness and common
sense which attend the application of the rule of reason."
The Huss court's unwillingness to accept a strict reading of the civil law
rule, which would have permitted subdividers to harm plaintiff's land within
extreme limits, demonstrated that the court was seeking a more just definition
of the legal relations of the parties. The court did not stop at a recognition of
defendants' easement, but looked to the consequences of the developer's
conduct in relation to an adjoining landowner. The subdivider was not
prohibited from inflicting injury on lower lands by Huss. Such a rule would
seriously impair development. The court only proscribed unreasonable devel-
opment.
The Huss opinion, however, does not support the conclusion that the
Illinois natural flow case law has been completely eclipsed by a new
reasonable use rule. The court considered the series of good husbandry cases
as an embodiment of a rule of reasonable agricultural development. A policy
of reasonableness which led to the good husbandry exception was then stated
to be applicable to defendants' non-agricultural alteration of natural drainage.
Thus, the policy of reasonableness which the court extended to urban
development did not supersede, but was drawn from, principles felt by the
court to be implicit in agricultural drainage cases. The well-developed rules
previously applicable under the good husbandry exception appeared to remain
intact. Therefore, after Huss, agricultural drainage cases seemingly will be
governed by the familiar natural flow rules generally requiring proof of
diversion for recovery. A full-scale reasonable use test applicable to all Illinois
drainage cases is not consistent with Huss.
CONCLUSION
As residential land development continues, surface water problems will
persist in Illinois. As a recent supreme court decision bearing on a subdivi-
der's liability for increased surface water flow, Huss will have an undeniable
impact on future litigation. Attorneys for individuals harmed by surface water
runoff will have to consider the practical meaning of the case in structuring
their pleadings and proof. Further, the developer must evaluate his potential
liability under Huss as a necessary element of his planning procedures. 4 The
value of Huss as an indicator of the direction Illinois courts will follow in
future cases rests on several suggested conclusions.
The decision implied a policy that recognized both the necessity for
development and the harmful potential of residential construction which may
cause the collection and discharge of large amounts of surface waters. This
policy reflects a shift in emphasis from the good husbandry exception, which
73. Id. at 330, 120 A.2d at 10.
74. See Elliott v. Nordlof, 83 Ill. App. 2d 279, 282, 227 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1967)
(subdivider who engineered streets and drainage system not relieved of liability for damages
caused by diversion of surface waters even though municipality accepted subdivision plat).
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favored the agricultural developer, to a rule which balances the interests of all
parties involved in urban development. To be consistent with the court's
policy that the developer's interest in conducting his business should be
balanced with the. interests of those harmed by the development, the
announced reasonable use rule will probably be implemented by a balancing
test. The court did not catalogue the factors to be weighed. However, the
analogous riparian balancing test and the factors considered by other courts in
following reasonable use rules may complement the holding in Huss."
The Huss policy as implemented by a reasonable use balancing test will
not be applicable in all drainage situations. The case involved a subdivider's
liability and, as a holding, cannot extend to agricultural drainage. Further, the
court did not indicate a willingness to extend the reasonable use rule to future
agricultural drainage cases. The urban development situation presents a more
complex fact pattern than that found in rural cases. A flexible rule which
requires consideration of all relevant factors would seem more suited to a fair
disposition of an urban drainage dispute than a rule based on rights inherent in
the fixed pattern of natural drainage. Therefore, Huss apparently signaled the
adoption of a reasonable use modification to the civil law rule in Illinois
surface water drainage cases involving urban development. Given the contin-
ually expanding need for residential construction and the harmful potential of
surface waters collected by subdivision roofs and streets, the change in the
law declared by Huss is welcome as a policy decision sanctioning the prudent
development of land.
John Fry
75. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text; Note, Ohio Surface Water Rights, 38
U. CIN. L. REV. 525, 538 (1969); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 826-28 (1939).
